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 Abstract :  University ranking has high public visibility, the ranking business has flourished, and institutions of higher 
education have not been able to ignore it. This study of university ranking presents general considerations of ranking 
and institutional responses to it, particularly considering reactions to ranking, ranking as a self-fulfilling prophecy, and 
ranking as a means of transforming qualities into quantities. The authors present a conceptual framework of university 
ranking based on three propositions and carry out a descriptive statistical analysis of U.S. and international ranking 
data to evaluate those propositions. The first proposition of university ranking is that ranking systems are demarcated 
by a high degree of stability, equilibrium, and path dependence. The second proposition links ranking to institutional 
identity. The third proposition posits that rankings function as a catalyst for institutional isomorphism. The conclusion 
reviews some important new developments in university ranking. 
 Practitioner Points 
 • Because rankings simplify, decontextualize, and magnify small differences, they can incentivize managers to 
focus on relative positioning rather than improvement in absolute terms. 
 • Rankings, once established, become important components of identity, and those organizations privileged by 
rankings strategically leverage them to shape their institutional identity. 
•  Ranking systems can function to inhibit diversity and promote uniformity and standardization. 
 Ageneration has passed since  U.S. News & World Report ( USNWR ) published its first newsstand guidebook  America ’ s Best Colleges in 1983 and 
 Best Graduate and Professional Schools in 1987. More 
than a decade has passed since the Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University Institute of Education first published the 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) in 
2003. In the ensuing years, the college and university 
ranking business has flourished. “There are three 
leading global ranking systems plus eight other global 
rankers of varying significance, and there are over 50 
national (U.S, Korea, Germany, Canada, etc.) ranking 
systems” (Hazelkorn  2011 , 5). University ranking 
systems have proven popular because they enable 
and formalize comparison. At the university level, it 
has been determined, for example, that a one-rank 
improvement in the  USNWR best colleges ranking 
leads to a 1 percentage point increase in the number 
of applicants the following year (Luca and Smith 
 2013 ). Because higher education is an important 
driver of economic development, university rankings 
also influence state and national competiveness 
(Hazelkorn  2011 ). 
 As the university ranking business has flourished, so, 
too, has the study of it. Research by university faculty 
in the formative years of university rankings tended 
to critique the endeavor (Diamond and Graham 
 2000 ; Dichev  2001 ; Frederickson  2001 ; Graham and 
Diamond  1997 ). In recent years, the study of ranking 
has become more longitudinally comparative, more 
analytically sophisticated, and more global (Erkkilä 
 2013 ; Espeland and Sauder  2007 ; Frederickson and 
Stazyk  2010 ; Hazelkorn  2011 ; Jones  2013 ; Sauder 
and Espeland  2009 ). With the passage of time, it 
is clear that ranking universities is not only here to 
stay, it is proving to be both resilient and surprisingly 
influential in university policy and practice. 
 The ranking of universities is not a distinct 
phenomenon applicable only within the domain of 
higher education. Rather, the evolving salience of 
rankings in higher education is best viewed within a 
broad context of modern demands for “accountability, 
transparency, and efficiency … and social measures 
designed to evaluate the performance of individuals 
and organizations” (Espeland and Sauder  2007 , 
1). Indeed, rankings, ratings, and report cards are 
established and prominent components of initiatives 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health 
care providers (Dranove et al.  2003 ; Fung et al.  2008 ; 
Mukamel, Haeder, and Weimer  2014 ), primary and 
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secondary schools (Hanushek and Raymond  2004 ; Kane and Staiger 
 2002 ), public sector organizations (Sanger  2008 ; Van Thiel and 
Leeuw 2002), and not-for-profit entities (Eckerd and Moulton  2011 ; 
Sloan  2009 ), among others. A rich and developing literature in public 
administration surveys the practical and theoretical implications of 
the public ’ s demand for performance measurement. These studies 
highlight the important and necessarily broad role played by external 
actors in translating organizational data into relevant and digestible 
performance information (Hood  2012 ; Lavertu  2015 ) and emphasize 
the potential ramifications of the large degree of latitude and 
discretion accompanying such efforts (Cooley  2015 ; Hood, Dixon, 
and Beeston  2008 ). If nothing else, the popularity of rankings noted 
in these diverse literatures reinforces the growing public appetite for 
such efforts and therefore demonstrates that rankings can only be 
ignored by organizations at their peril (Van Dyke 2005). 
 In this article, we describe the rankings of universities as 
an example of the social construction of reality and of 
institutionalization (Berger and Luckmann  1966 ; March and Olsen 
 1989 ). University rankings impose on the richly varied, often 
uneven, and idiosyncratic world of higher education positivist 
assumptions of order based on formalized hierarchies of quality 
Ranking applies rationalist assumptions to 
the often ambiguous and hazy processes 
and objectives of universities and to the 
distinctive characteristics of institutions of 
higher education—public or private, flagship 
or regional, research or teaching, selective or 
open, large or small. Once institutionalized, 
ranking regimes “shape the definitions of 
alternatives and influence the perception and 
the construction of the reality within which 
action takes place” (March and Olsen  1995 , 19). Action, in the 
institutionalized context, is based on established structures, roles, 
identities, rules, and practices and the logic of appropriateness or 
“making sense” of the situation. We first review three important 
features of university ranking from the institutionalist perspective: 
ranking and reactivity, ranking as self-fulfilling prophecy, and 
ranking as commensuration (Espeland and Sauder  2007 ). We then 
set out a conceptual framework of rankings in higher education 
designed to facilitate scholarly conversations and debates, research, 
and further theoretical development. 
 Ranking and Reactivity 
 Reactivity is understood as describing and explaining how 
“individuals (and organizations) alter their behavior in reaction 
to being evaluated, observed, or measured” (Espeland and Sauder 
 2007 , 6). Ranking and other forms of performance measurement 
and organizational evaluation elicit responses from the individuals 
and organizations being ranked or measured. In many cases, 
reactivity is keenly understood by those promulgating rankings as 
an instrument through which they can attempt to alter behavior 
in the direction of policy they favor. For example, New York State 
publicly ranks or “scorecards” the performance of medical doctors 
using criteria such as mortality rates. In response, 79 percent of 
cardiologists reported that their decision to “perform angioplasty 
or to intervene in critically ill patients was influenced by potential 
effects on their scorecards” (Narins et al.  2005 , referenced in 
Espeland and Sauder  2007 , 2). Strathern ( 1997 , 2002) found that 
the application of performance and evaluative measures in Great 
Britain was central to massive reforms in schooling, universities, 
budgeting, and health care in the 1980s. In short, ranking and 
rating has become a primary tool in the advocacy group toolkit 
(Gormley and Weimer  1999 ). 
 In its college ranking program,  USNWR aims to provide assessable 
information to each potential education consumer and to 
assist each in the search for the best school.  USNWR makes no 
statements about transformation in higher education or about 
holding universities accountable. Nevertheless, the initial and 
continuing reactions to  USNWR college rankings have set in motion 
important institutional changes. It is difficult to use the language 
of institutional improvement or advancement without reference to 
measures of performance and comparison, particularly comparison 
by rank. In response to formalized ranking regimes, both the 
substance and the language of quality in higher education have 
been reduced to simplified surrogates of quality: rank, status, and 
prestige. 
 One need not look hard to identify institutional adaptations to 
rankings, although whether such efforts are consistent with the 
spirit of rankings remains subject to some 
debate. For instance, George Washington 
University recently abolished the requirement 
for students to submit an SAT or ACT 
score for consideration for undergraduate 
admission. On one hand, this action can be 
viewed as firing a shot across the bow of the 
trend of increased quantification within the 
 USNWR rankings; on the other, the fact that 
the number of applicants will undoubtedly 
rise relative to acceptances after the test score requirement is 
dropped means that George Washington will likely become a more 
selective institution in the eyes of  USNWR after the policy change. 
 Ranking as Self-Fulfi lling Prophecy 
 Among the more important characteristics of reaction to university 
ranking is Robert Merton ’ s concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy, “a 
false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes 
the originally false definition of the situation come true” (1968, 
182–83, 477). The use of the self-fulfilling prophecy concept need 
not be limited to false beliefs or understandings. Any expectation or 
assumption that is defined or understood to be real, whether true 
or false, when subjected to measurement or evaluation, will increase 
the validity of the original expectation or assumption and thereby 
encourage behaviors that conforms to it (Espeland and Sauder 
 2007 ). For example,  USNWR ’s current ranking metrics assign 12.5 
percent of a college ’ s grade or rank to be a function of student 
selectivity, with 65 percent of that based on student standardized 
test scores, 25 percent on the proportion of matriculating freshmen 
in the top decile of their graduating class, and 10 percent on the 
college ’ s acceptance rate. Empirical evidence suggests that ACT, 
SAT, and other test scores are weaker predictors of college success 
than high school grades, and students who do not submit test 
scores (an increasing number of colleges do not require test scores 
of applicants) appear to do as well in college as those who do not. 
Nevertheless, test scores are weighed more heavily than grades in 
 USNWR assumptions about student selectivity (Zwick  2007 ). 
 University rankings impose on 
the richly varied, often uneven, 
and idiosyncratic world of 
higher education positivist 
assumptions of order based on 
formalized hierarchies of quality. 
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Included in student selectivity criteria is the assumption that the 
fewer students an elite university admits from its applicant pool, the 
better that university must be. 
 These student selectivity criteria and the assumptions on which 
they are based are, at a minimum, debatable. Nevertheless, what 
is not debatable is that university-level responses to  USNWR 
student selectivity criteria have become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
In pursuit of improved rankings, college admissions processes (and 
admissions to law schools, graduate schools, etc.) work to generate 
large pools of applicants, favor applicants with high test scores, and 
try to limit those admitted to those in the top 10 percent of their 
high school graduating class (Lovett  2005 ). Colleges, particularly 
in the upper ranks, conform to the  USNWR assumptions about 
student selectivity and have made them come true. Similarly, the 
22.5 percent of the  USNWR rank determined by student retention 
provides a compelling explanation for the current trends of hiring 
of student retention specialists, the opening of offices of student 
success, and the development of systems for targeting services 
to students identified as high risk of dropout prior to degree 
completion. 
 Those who study the  USNWR ranking of law schools have 
found that past rankings are the strongest predictor of current 
reputation score, consistent with the well-known “anchoring 
effect” phenomenon uncovered in recent work in psychology and 
behavioral economics (Kahneman  2011 ; Tversky and Kahneman 
 1974 ). Ample empirical literature demonstrates the powerful 
conditioning effect of past rankings on current assessments of 
quality (Bastedo and Bowman  2010 ; Bowman and Bastedo  2011 ; 
Stake  2006 ). For example, fully 40 percent of law school rankings 
are based on so-called peer assessment, evaluation of each law 
school (on a five-point scale from “marginal” to “outstanding”) 
through surveys filled out by deans, faculty members, lawyers, and 
judges. Because it is impossible for a dean or a judge to know very 
much about each of the approximately 200 accredited law schools, 
respondents tend to rely on past judgments of law schools, codified 
in previous year rankings (Espeland and Sauder  2007 ). 
 Ranking as Commensuration 
 Commensuration is the transformation of qualities into quantities 
that share a metric. Commensuration is fundamental to quantitative 
measuring and numeric comparison 
(Espeland  1998 ; Espeland and Stevens  1998 ). 
“Commensuration shapes what we pay 
attention to, which things are connected to 
other things, and how we express sameness 
and difference” (Espeland and Sauder  2007 , 
16). The processes of commensuration involve 
sorting out those characteristics and qualities 
of universities that are to be included in a 
shared metric and those to be excluded. It is 
a process of simplification and decontextualization that reduces the 
qualities and characteristics of universities to a few and, ultimately, 
to one number. Ranking is, therefore, an exercise in simplification. 
 The processes of simplifications of this type, following March 
and Simon ( 1958 ), make such numeric information seem 
more authoritative, more robust, and more definitive than 
narrative information. Simplification masks complexity, obscures 
assumptions, and hides ambiguity. Information thus simplified is 
made more portable and more easily recallable. It is much easier to 
remember a university ’ s rank than to recall the details of a narrative 
description. It is also easy to assume that the meaning of what 
appears to be an authoritative number or rank is universal and stable 
(Espeland and Sauder  2007 ). 
 University rankings are constructed using raw scores, such as 
median grade-point average or median SAT. Such raw scores are 
obviously quite highly correlated, and the transformation of such 
continuous measures into ordinal scales magnifies the minute 
differences between the universities ranked first, second, and third. 
In  USNWR rankings, ties and multiple ties are common. Rankings 
produce a hierarchical relationship between each university being 
ranked, with seemingly equally sized intervals between universities 
that are “better than” or “worse than” other universities. In other 
words, rankings assign precise numbers to each institution although 
distinctions between institutions are often minuscule (Hood, Dixon, 
and Beeston  2008 ). This exercise serves primarily to incentivize 
universities to focus on relative positioning rather than absolute 
changes (Espeland and Sauder  2007 ). 
 A Conceptual Framework of University Ranking 
 Having reviewed some patterns of university responses to ranking 
regimes, the processes of self-fulfilling prophecy, and the effects of 
commensuration, we employ these axioms to propose a conceptual 
framework of university ranking. We utilize this framework for 
the analysis of data and for further descriptions of responses to 
rankings and to our claim that university ranking regimes constitute 
an “ivory cage,” a higher education version of Max Weber ’ s 
(1968) “iron cage,” a state of institutional isomorphism in which 
universities are systematically incentivized toward homogeneity 
(DiMaggio and Powell  1983 ).
 Proposition 1: Under ranking regimes, universities and 
colleges may in the short run move incrementally up or down 
the ranks, but in the long run university ranking tends toward 
equilibrium and system stability. 
 Among the earliest clues that ranking regimes tend toward stability 
are found in the work of Dichev ( 2001 ). The author analyzed the 
top 25 national universities and the top 25 
national liberal arts colleges for the early 
years (1989–98) of the  USNWR rankings, 
finding that
 [C]hanges in the USN rankings have a 
strong tendency to revert in the next two 
rankings. The reversibility in rankings is 
strong not only in statistical terms but 
seems to account for a strikingly large 
part of the total variation in ranking changes. Using a simple 
model of two-period reversibility, it appears that between 
70 and 80 percent of the variation in ranking change is due 
to noise: transitory effects which quickly disappear in later 
rankings. Thus, much of the “news” in  USNWR annual 
college rankings is essentially meaningless noise. (Dichev 
 2001 , 239) 
 Th e processes of commensura-
tion involve sorting out those 
characteristics and qualities 
of universities that are to be 
included in a shared metric and 
those to be excluded .
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 Table 1   USNWR Top 50 University Rankings, 2000–2012 (Sorted by Rank in 2012) 
 University  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Harvard University 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Princeton University 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Yale University 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Columbia University 10 10 9 10 11 9 9 9 9 8 8 4 4 
University of Chicago 13 10 9 12 13 14 15 9 9 8 8 9 5 
Stanford University 6 6 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 5 5 4 4 5 7 4 7 4 4 7 5 
California Institute of Technology 1 4 4 4 5 8 7 4 5 6 4 7 5 
University of Pennsylvania 7 6 5 4 5 4 4 7 5 6 4 5 5 
Duke University 7 8 8 4 5 5 5 8 8 8 10 9 10 
Dartmouth College 11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 10 9 11 
Northwestern University 14 13 12 10 11 11 12 14 14 12 12 12 12 
Johns Hopkins University 7 15 16 15 14 14 13 16 14 15 14 13 13 
Washington University (St. Louis) 17 15 14 12 9 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 14 
Brown University 14 15 16 17 17 13 15 15 14 16 16 15 15 
Cornell University 11 10 14 14 14 14 13 12 12 14 15 15 15 
Vanderbilt University 20 22 21 21 19 18 18 18 19 18 17 17 17 
Rice University 14 13 12 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
University of Notre Dame 19 19 19 18 19 18 18 20 19 18 20 19 19 
Emory University 18 18 18 18 18 20 20 18 17 18 17 20 20 
University of California, Berkeley 20 20 20 20 21 21 20 21 21 21 21 22 21 
Georgetown University 23 23 22 24 23 25 23 23 23 23 23 21 22 
Carnegie Mellon University 23 23 22 21 23 22 22 21 22 22 22 23 23 
University of Southern California 42 35 34 31 30 30 30 27 27 27 26 23 23 
Wake Forest University 28 28 26 25 28 27 27 30 30 28 28 25 25 
University of Virginia 22 20 24 23 21 22 23 24 23 23 24 25 25 
University of California, Los Angeles 25 25 26 25 26 25 25 26 25 25 24 25 25 
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor 25 25 25 25 25 22 25 24 25 26 27 29 28 
Tufts University 29 29 28 28 27 28 27 27 28 28 28 28 29 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 27 25 28 28 29 29 27 27 28 30 28 30 29 
Brandeis University 31 31 34 31 32 32 34 31 31 31 31 34 31 
Boston College 39 38 38 40 40 37 40 34 35 34 34 31 31 
College of William and Mary 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 31 33 32 33 31 33 
New York University 34 33 32 35 35 32 37 34 34 33 32 33 33 
University of Rochester 32 33 36 36 35 37 34 34 35 35 35 37 35 
Georgia Institute of Technology 40 35 41 38 37 41 37 38 35 35 35 35 36 
University of California, San Diego 32 31 31 31 32 35 32 38 38 35 35 35 37 
University of Miami (FL) N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 50 47 38 
University of California, Davis 42 41 41 43 43 42 48 47 42 44 42 39 38 
Lehigh University 34 38 38 40 37 37 32 33 31 35 35 37 38 
Case Western Reserve University 34 38 38 37 37 35 37 38 41 41 41 41 38 
University of Washington 44 45 45 47 45 46 45 42 42 41 42 41 42 
University of Wisconsin–Madison 34 35 32 31 32 32 34 34 38 35 39 45 42 
University of California, Santa Barbara 44 45 48 47 45 45 45 47 44 44 42 39 42 
University of Texas at Austin 44 49 48 47 N/R 46 N/R 47 44 47 47 45 45 
Yeshiva University 44 45 41 40 40 46 45 44 N/R 50 N/R 50 45 
University of California, Irvine 49 41 41 45 45 43 40 44 44 44 46 41 45 
Pennsylvania State University–University Park 40 44 46 45 48 50 48 47 48 47 47 47 45 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 34 41 36 38 40 37 42 41 38 40 39 47 45 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute N/R 49 48 47 48 46 43 42 44 41 42 41 50 
Tulane University 44 45 46 43 44 43 43 44 50 N/R 50 N/R 50 
George Washington University N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 50 
Syracuse University N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 50 N/R 50 N/R N/R N/R N/R 
University of Florida 49 N/R N/R N/R 48 50 50 47 49 49 47 N/R N/R 
Pepperdine University N/R 49 48 47 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Texas A&M University–College Station N/R N/R 48 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
N/R = Not ranked.
 Here, we update that work and expand on its scope. Following 
this early analysis of university rankings, table  1 sets out a 12-year 
compilation of  USNWR ’s ranking of the 50 best U.S. universities 
starting in 2000, arranged by their rank in 2012, the right-hand 
column. 
 Simply scanning table  1 suggests a general equilibrium. Harvard, 
Princeton, and Yale are ranked either first, second, third, or fourth 
(Princeton once and Yale once) depending on the year. Columbia 
is ranked fourth in 2011 and 2012 but was ranked between eighth 
and eleventh in earlier years. Chicago is nearly the same. Perusing 
the reported individual components that make up the rankings (not 
reported here) suggests that these improvements seem to be largely 
driven by changes in admissions selectivity. 
 An application of simple longitudinal descriptive statistics 
is presented in table  2 , which displays historical correlation 
coefficients for two components of the  USNWR rankings: rank 
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(1–50, inclusive of ties) and overall score (which  USNWR scales so 
that the top-ranking university in a given year receives a score of 
100). Each row reports the estimated coefficient of determination 
for the value of the  USNWR score component in the year listed in 
column 1 and the corresponding value for the year 2012, calculated 
using the 47 universities that are observed as Tier 1 institutions in 
each year observed in the data. We report the Pearson ’ s correlation 
coefficient for overall score and the Spearman ’ s rank correlation 
coefficient for ranks. 
 As this table demonstrates, there are strong statistical associations 
between the individual components of the  USNWR rankings over 
time. As one would expect, the explanatory power of historical 
values declines slightly as the time lag increases, although a nearly 
perfect positive linear relationship persists between the 2012 
components and the corresponding values from 2003—nine years 
earlier. 
 Longitudinal equilibrium as the first proposition of university 
ranking has also been the primary finding of studies of American 
law schools (Espeland and Sauder  2007 ; Jones  2013 ; Sauder and 
Espeland  2009 ; Sauder and Lancaster  2006 ), schools of business 
(Iacobucci  2013 ), and schools of public policy and administration 
(Frederickson and Stazyk  2010 ). These findings are particularly 
relevant to the study of university rankings and ranking systems 
given the observed “halo effect,” in which the reputational 
assessments of individual programs or departments are conflated by 
the reputation of the university of a whole, leading, in some cases, to 
nonexistent professional schools at prestigious universities receiving 
high reputational assessments (Brooks  2005 ; Webster  1981 ). 
 We turn now to the analysis of global ranking systems. We have 
chosen the Academic Ranking of World Universities rankings 
because they have the longest history of global ranking, having 
started in 2003. The ARWU rankings are useful for comparative 
purposes because they emphasize research productivity and do not 
include subjective peer review or student selectivity criteria. ARWU 
ranking criteria assign 10 percent to alumni winning Nobel Prizes 
and Fields Medals and 20 percent to staff winning the same awards, 
20 percent to highly cited (the “citation impact factor”) research 
in 21 broad academic subjects, 20 percent for papers published 
in  Nature and  Science or other leading peer-reviewed journals, 
20 percent to articles in journals indexed in the Science or Social 
Science Citation Indices, and 10 percent to per capita academic 
performance (the weighted scores of the foregoing five indicators 
divided by the number of full-time equivalent [FTE] academic 
staff ). Table  3 presents the ARWU rankings from 2003 to 2014. 
 The most notable similarity between the  USNWR ranking of 
American universities and the ARWU ranking of global universities 
is the ultra-stability of the top universities in both rankings. It is 
notable that top American universities are reordered not just by 
the inclusion of non-American universities but also by the research 
emphasis found in the ARWU criteria. For example, Duke is 
number 10 in the  USNWR rankings and number 36 in the ARWU 
rankings. Dartmouth is number 11 in the  USNWR rankings 
but is not in the top 50 in the ARWU rankings. In the opposite 
direction, the University of California, San Diego is ranked 37 in 
the  USNWR rankings and 14 in the ARWU rankings. The point is 
that the internal validity of rankings is directly related to the choice 
of ranking criteria and the assumptions on which these criteria are 
based. Once ranking criteria are established, however, stability and 
equilibrium take over. 
 Table  4 presents an application of the same descriptive statics to the 
ARWU top 50 global universities that were applied to the  USNWR 
rankings of American universities shown in table  2 . To maintain 
comparability with the table  2 , table  4 displays the same years and is 
limited to the 39 universities that appear in the top 50 in all of the 
years listed. 
 As was found in the analysis of  USNWR rankings, the longitudinal 
correlations among the ARWU ranking components are quite high: the 
correlations of the 2003 and 2012 components range from .93 to .96. 
 In the longitudinal analysis of both American and global 
universities, it is notable that tables  1 and  3 suggest that year-
to-year fluctuation in ranking is greater among lower-ranked 
programs compared with those receiving higher rankings, a 
proposition that is wholly expected given the literature on 
anchoring effects in assessment and ranking regimes. We test this 
observation empirically by analyzing the comparative stability of 
rankings over time using the  USNWR rankings of the top 100 
(inclusive of ties) American universities for the years 2004–12. 
Years prior to 2004 are omitted because  USNWR only assigned 
ranks and overall scores to the top 50 universities in those years. 
We begin by calculating year-by-year changes in rankings for each 
university that appears in the top 100. For instance, MIT was 
ranked 4 in 2004 and 5 in 2005, so it is assigned a score of −1 in 
2005, indicating that it dropped one position. Virginia Tech was 
ranked 77 in 2007 and 71 in 2008, so it is assigned a score of 6 in 
2008, indicating its increase in the rankings. We take the absolute 
values of these scores, as we are interested in absolute rather than 
directional changes. Finally, we divide the top 100 universities 
in each year into quartiles based on the overall score assigned by 
 USNWR in that year and calculate the average absolute scores for 
each quartile across all years. These average scores are shown in 
table  5 . 
 These scores are interpreted as the expected change (increase 
or decrease) in rank from for one year to the next for a typical 
university in each quartile. As the data show, the average member 
of the top quartile can expect its rank to fluctuate by less than one 
position each year. As we decrease in ranking to the fourth quartile, 
the expected annual change increases significantly, with the average 
member of the bottom quartile experiencing annual changes of over 
five positions. 
 Table 2   Longitudinal Correlations of  USNWR Ranks and Scores 
 2012 Component 
 Rank  Overall Score 
2011 0.994 0.997 
2010 0.990 0.995 
2009 0.986 0.993 
2008 0.983 0.990 
2007 0.979 0.987 
2006 0.967 0.982 
2005 0.971 0.982 
2004 0.973 0.979 
2003 0.968 0.976
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 Table 3   ARWU Top 50 University Rankings, 2003–14 (Sorted by Rank in 2014) 
 University  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Harvard University 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Stanford University 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 4 3 
University of California, Berkeley 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 3 4 
University of Cambridge 5 3 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Princeton University 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 
California Institute of Technology 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 
Columbia University 10 9 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 
University of Chicago 11 10 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
University of Oxford 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 
Yale University 8 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
University of California, Los Angeles 15 16 14 14 13 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 
Cornell University 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 
University of California, San Diego 14 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 15 15 14 14 
University of Washington 16 20 17 17 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 
University of Pennsylvania 18 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 15 16 
The Johns Hopkins University 24 22 19 20 19 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 
University of California, San Francisco 13 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich 25 27 27 27 27 24 23 23 23 23 20 19 
University College London 20 25 26 26 25 22 21 21 20 21 21 20 
University of Tokyo 19 14 20 19 20 19 20 20 21 20 21 21 
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor 21 19 21 21 21 21 22 22 22 22 23 22 
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine 17 23 23 23 23 27 26 26 24 24 24 22 
University of Toronto 23 24 24 24 23 24 27 27 26 27 28 24 
University of Wisconsin–Madison 27 18 16 16 17 17 17 17 19 19 19 24 
Kyoto University 30 21 22 22 22 23 24 24 27 26 26 26 
New York University N/R 32 29 29 30 31 32 31 29 27 27 27 
Northwestern University 29 30 31 33 29 30 30 29 30 30 30 28 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 45 25 25 25 26 26 25 25 25 25 25 28 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 37 33 32 32 33 28 28 28 28 29 29 30 
Duke University 32 31 32 31 32 32 31 35 35 36 31 31 
Washington University in St. Louis 22 28 28 28 28 29 29 30 31 31 32 32 
Rockefeller University 28 29 30 30 30 32 32 34 33 32 34 33 
University of Colorado Boulder 31 34 35 34 34 34 34 32 32 33 33 34 
Pierre and Marie Curie University—Paris 6 N/R 41 46 45 39 42 40 39 41 42 37 35 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 38 39 41 42 41 43 36 
University of British Columbia 35 36 37 36 36 35 36 36 37 39 40 37 
University of Manchester N/R N/R N/R 50 48 40 41 44 38 40 41 38 
University of Texas at Austin 47 40 36 39 38 39 38 38 35 35 36 39 
University of Copenhagen N/R N/R N/R N/R 46 45 43 40 43 44 42 39 
University of California, Santa Barbara 26 35 34 35 35 36 35 32 33 34 35 41 
University of Paris Sud (Paris 11) N/R 48 N/R N/R N/R 49 43 45 40 37 39 42 
University of Maryland, College Park N/R N/R 47 37 37 37 37 36 38 38 38 43 
University of Melbourne N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 44 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas 34 36 38 38 39 41 48 49 N/R 48 46 45 
University of Edinburgh 43 47 47 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 45 
Karolinska Institute 39 46 45 48 N/R N/R 50 42 44 42 44 47 
University of California, Irvine 44 N/R 47 44 45 46 46 46 48 45 45 47 
Heidelberg University N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 49 
University of Munich 48 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 49 
Australian National University 49 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Utrecht University 40 39 41 40 42 47 N/R 50 48 N/R N/R N/R 
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 38 44 43 46 47 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
University of Southern California 40 48 50 47 50 50 46 46 46 46 47 N/R 
Technical University Munich N/R 45 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 47 N/R 50 N/R 
Brown University 49 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
Vanderbilt University 32 38 39 41 41 42 41 N/R N/R 50 49 N/R 
Pennsylvania State University–University Park 40 43 39 42 43 42 45 43 45 49 N/R N/R 
University of Zurich 45 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
University of California, Davis 36 42 41 42 43 48 49 46 48 47 47 N/R 
University of Pittsburgh N/R 48 43 48 49 N/R 50 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 
N/R = Not ranked.
 At first glance, this finding appears to provide empirical evidence that 
counters the stasis demonstrated earlier. However, the two are easily 
reconciled if the fluctuation observed in the lower ranks is random 
noise rather than consistent upward or downward trending over time. 
In other words, the ranking system overall exhibits a high degree 
of aggregate stability across all institutions—but the lower-ranked 
institutions are ordered with less precision in any particular year. 
 Our findings corroborate those of Gnolek, Falciano, and Kuncl 
( 2014 ), who developed a dynamic model of the categories (such 
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 Table 4   Longitudinal Correlations of ARWU Ranks and Scores 
 2012 Component 
 Rank  Overall Score 
2011 0.998 0.999 
2010 0.986 0.998 
2009 0.994 0.997 
2008 0.991 0.995 
2007 0.987 0.994 
2006 0.982 0.993 
2005 0.984 0.993 
2004 0.975 0.987 
2003 0.930 0.961
 Table 5   Stability in  USNWR Rankings, by Quartile 
 Quartile (Position)  Average Change Score 
1 (1–25) .872 
2 (26–50) 1.85 
3 (51–75) 3.56 
4 (75–100) 5.30
as student selectivity), subfactors (such as SAT or ACT scores), 
and the weights assigned to them (7.5 percent) by  USNWR for 
the years leading up to and including 2012. They determined that 
annual rank changes four or fewer positions should be considered 
“noise,” with only longer-range changes in the same direction 
being significant. Using their model, Gnolek, Falciano, and Kuncl 
demonstrate that for a school ranked in the mid-30s to move into 
the top 20 would require a sustained increase of more than $112 
million to its annual academic expenditures over several years, 
and even then, because of the small amount of change over time 
in  USNWR ranking subfactors, there is less than a .01 percent 
probability of improved ranking.
 Proposition 2: Universities strategically employ the status 
afforded by rankings to shape and define institutional 
identity. 
 As university ranking emerged in the late twentieth century, 
so, too, did university strategic planning. The parallel trend is 
not surprising. The language and logic of ranking are suited to 
the rationalist assumptions of strategic planning. The coming 
together of ranking and university strategic planning is particularly 
interesting, especially in the cases of those strategic plans that aspire 
to significantly improved ranking. Among the more interesting 
examples of this is found in the case of the University of Kentucky 
and its former president Dr. Lee T. Todd, Jr. 
 After a successful career as a professor 
of electrical engineering and a noted 
entrepreneur, Dr. Todd took office as the 
11th president of the University of Kentucky 
in 2001. Four years earlier, in 1997, the 
Kentucky state legislature had made a compact 
with the University directing it to become a 
top-20 public research institution by 2020, 
a classic example of leveraging rankings for the purposes of setting 
performance targets (Hood  2012 ). In response, President Todd and 
his staff developed the “University of Kentucky Top 20 Business 
Plan” (TOP 20 Plan), which included increased enrollments, 
increased graduation rates, increased numbers of faculty, increased 
research funding, and increased university engagement in schools, 
businesses, farms, and communities. To achieve these goals, the TOP 
20 Plan requested an increase of $260 million in state funding over 
15 years. At the time, the business plan was adopted, the University 
of Kentucky was ranked by  U.S. News & World Report 35th among 
public research universities and in the unranked second tier in the 
overall rankings. State appropriations for public higher education 
increased in absolute terms in Kentucky after the adoption of the 
compact in 1997, even after adjusting for inflation. However, the 
trend line becomes relatively flat if these changes are scaled by 
changes in either total state population or personal income. 
 After nearly 10 years in office, President Todd resigned in September 
2010. At the time of his resignation, the University of Kentucky 
was ranked 38 by  U.S. News and World Report among American 
public universities and 129 overall, suggesting little relative change 
and a failure to meet the compact ’ s objectives. However, despite 
the failure to improve meaningfully in rankings, the university did 
improve in absolute terms in some areas, including peer scores and 
graduation rates. Under the leadership of the current president, 
Dr. Eli Capilouto, the new University of Kentucky strategic plan, 
“Seeing Tomorrow,” does not explicitly refer to rankings in framing 
and describing university goals. 
 In her analysis of global university ranking systems, Hazelkorn 
found that “one of the first places where the influence of rankings 
can be seen is in university vision or mission statement and 
strategic plans.” She notes four common approaches to the 
incorporation of rankings within strategic planning: “1) rankings 
as an explicit goal; 2) rankings as an implicit goal; 3) rankings for 
target setting; and 4) rankings as a measure of success” (2011, 97). 
The usual form of explicit ranking goals took the form of plans 
to “be in the top 20” or “be in the first tier.” With the passage of 
time, as the stability of rankings has become increasingly clear, 
ranking statements as part of university strategic plans tend 
to describe implicit and more general goals such as “achieving 
national standing” or being “world-class.” Rankings as measures of 
success now almost always take the form of implicit vision or goal 
statements, such as “the university is moving in the right direction” 
or “the university is making progress,” rather than describing a 
specific rank or ranking aspiration. 
 However, these suppositions are difficult to demonstrate 
empirically. Little systematic evidence exists that explains the 
relative prominence and consideration afforded rankings in 
the strategic planning process. Gathering 
reliable quantitative data that speak to 
the explicit utilization of rankings and 
ranking criteria in guiding university 
planning and policy making is difficult, as 
public access to artifacts such as planning 
documents, minutes from board meetings, 
and the like is highly uneven across the 
individual universities. In lieu of broad and 
comprehensive access to such documents, we instead develop a 
proxy measure of rankings prominence by taking raw counts of 
the number of unique web pages that explicitly reference rankings 
across all pages indexed within a given university ’ s website. We 
 Little systematic evidence 
exists that explains the relative 
prominence and consideration 
aff orded rankings in the strate-
gic planning process .
University Rankings: Evidence and a Conceptual Framework 797
use this measure to proxy the relative consideration that different 
universities give to rankings as a means to shape their identities. 
The quantitative analysis of text scraped from individual websites 
and the indices maintained by search engines is becoming an 
increasingly common approach to measuring difficult to quantify 
social phenomena ranging from the relative priorities of U.S. 
senators (Grimmer  2010 ) to citizen racial attitudes (Stephens-
Davidowitz  2014 ) and public perceptions of private firms (Bollen, 
Mao, and Zeng  2011 ). We argue that differences in these counts 
meaningfully demonstrates the validity of proposition 2, in 
the broader sense that they reflect, with noise, the prominence 
afforded rank by institutions in defining and shaping their outward 
persona—a key component of strategic planning. 
 To gather these data, we begin with the universe of 268 universities 
listed in the “Best National Universities” list published by  USNWR 
in 2012 (the last year of our rankings data), including all four tiers. 
We first conducted 268 Google web queries to ascertain the root 
domain for each university ’ s website. For example, the University of 
Kansas ’ s root domain is “ku.edu,” indicating that all pages hosted on 
all subdomains by the university contain a reference to this common 
top-level domain name. 
 We next conducted a second round of 268 Google searches, which 
were restricted to web pages associated with a single university ’ s 
root domain. For this round of searches, we limit our results to 
pages containing the phrases “news and world report rankings” or 
“news & world report rankings” (thereby avoiding the potential 
complication associated with “U.S.” versus “US”). Each Google 
search returned an aggregate number of identified search results, 
indicating the total number of unique web pages hosted on a 
university ’ s domain that matched the specified search parameters. 
It is this number that we employ in the analysis that follows. 
Figure  1 plots the distribution of this variable using a kernel 
density plot. 
 As this plot shows, our variable exhibits a high degree of positive 
skewness, consistent with the expected distribution of a variable 
measuring raw counts. Accordingly, we report nonparametric 
descriptive statistics and employ nonparametric statistical tests in 
the analysis which follows. 
 Across all 268 universities, the median number of unique web pages 
that reference  USNWR rankings is 25, with an interquartile range 
of 78.5. Consistent with figure  1 , this demonstrates there is marked 
heterogeneity in terms of the frequency of reference to  USNWR 
rankings across university websites. Further, we find systematic 
differences in the frequency of unique pages making reference 
to rankings according to the university ’ s  USNWR rank. Table  6 
tabulates the median number of unique web pages referencing 
 USNWR rankings and the count of domains that do not reference 
 USNWR rankings, disaggregated by  USNWR rank quartile. Quartile 
1 includes universities ranked 1–68. Quartile 2 contains universities 
ranked 71–132. Quartile 3 includes universities ranked 138–194. 
Quartile 4 contains all unranked universities (those appearing in 
Tier 4). 
 As this table demonstrates, there are significant differences in the 
median number of web pages containing references to the  USNWR 
rankings across the rank quintiles, with  USNWR rankings being 
referenced much more frequently on the websites of universities 
that are of higher  USNWR rank. A Kruskal-Wallis test of medians 
strongly rejects the null of no differences in the medians across the 
specified ranking quartiles (chi 2 (3) = 98.425,  p = .0001). Universities 
in the top quartile are much more likely to reference their ranking 
than universities of lower rank. This observation is reinforced by 
the raw counts of domains that do not make mention of  USNWR 
rankings. No domains in the top quartile fail to mention rankings, 
while more than 27 percent of university domains in the lowest 
quartile do not mention rankings at all. Consistent with proposition 
2, this is strong suggestive evidence that highly ranked universities 
employ the language of rankings and reference their  USNWR ranks 
to reinforce their own stature and identity. Patterns of reaction to 
the work of ranking organizations are the attempts of university 
leaders to leverage and make sense of the rankings. 
 Naturally, this evidence is suggestive at best. A plausible alternative 
to this proposition is that rankings are descriptive rather than 
proscriptive—that is, the rankings reflect what the privileged 
universities do rather than independently and proscriptively shape 
their behaviors. Both are likely true in practice, as the viability of 
any ranking system in the marketplace hinges on the broader social 
recognition of the rankings as legitimate and valid (Dill and Soo 
 2005 ). There is ample evidence that  USNWR has been responsive 
to the market, including most obviously its shift away from a 
purely reputational survey of quality in its early years to a model 
that balanced subjective reputational data with more “objective” 
measures (Meredith  2004 ). Nonetheless, there is much evidence that 
suggests that the instrument of the rankings influences university 
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behaviors in ways largely independent from the underlying quality 
measures that the rankings intend to measure and evaluate. For 
example, Ehrenberg ( 2002 ) provides an account of a university 
that proposed to increase faculty salaries for the sole purpose of 
improving the “faculty resources” metrics of the  USNWR rankings, 
independent of any actual discussion of the theoretical or actual 
improvements in teaching quality that could result. As Bowman and 
Bastedo lament, “over time, rankings increasingly  become reputation, 
rather than reputation being an independent indicator that rankings 
can use to assess changes in quality” (2011, 432).
 Proposition 3: Formalized ranking strengthens the forces 
of institutional isomorphism. This ultimately incentivizes 
universities to resemble one another, holding other factors 
constant. 
 It was Weber (1968) who described modern organizations as 
change-resistant “iron cages” on which we come to depend. In their 
adaption of Weber ’ s iron cage thesis, DiMaggio and Powell ( 1983 ) 
set out a theory of institutional isomorphism that is particularly 
suited to explaining the influence of university ranking regimes. 
Modern universities are bureaucracies subject to the forces of stasis, 
homogenization, equilibrium, and path dependence. Patterns of 
organizational change associated with responding to university 
ranking regimes result in “processes that make organizations more 
similar without making them more efficient” (DiMaggio and Powell 
 1983 , 147). 
 Theories of institutional isomorphism 
are particularly suited to explaining the 
influence of ranking on universities. 
Modern universities are highly complex 
bureaucracies of order, reliability, and 
predictability. Patterns of institutional 
isomorphism are a particular characteristic of 
organizations, such as universities, that operate in fields in which 
there is an uncertain and difficult to measure relationship between 
means and end and in fields in which agreement on preferred 
outcomes is illusive (DiMaggio and Powell  1983 ). Three forms of 
institutional isomorphism are evident in higher education. Coercive 
isomorphism results from imposed rules and policies, a common 
legal environment, licensing, and especially systems of accreditation. 
Normative isomorphic pressures include the filtering processes of 
formal education and credentialing, with professional organizations 
serving as carriers of norms, standards, and culture. Most 
important in higher education is mimetic isomorphism in which 
“organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations 
in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful 
(DiMaggio and Powell  1983 , 152). In the case of higher education, 
one must add the word “prestigious” to the words “legitimate” and 
“successful” to account for mimicking in higher education. 
 In his study on the relationship between diversity and reputation in 
higher education, Van Vught (2008) contrasts conflicting theoretical 
arguments regarding whether differentiation or homogenization 
should naturally emerge from systems of higher education. That 
work focuses on the nature of the dynamics of the relationship 
between organizations and the environments in which they 
operate as a key driving factor, identifying the common values 
held by administrators and faculty members trained and socialized 
within academia (a form of normative isomorphism) as well as 
the centralized planning mechanisms adopted in many states and 
nations (a form of coercive isomorphism) as external environmental 
factors promoting system stability and driving de-differentiation. 
To that list, we would add the influence of rankings. Because 
rankings favor certain metrics that privilege certain activities 
(academic and research performance) and institutions over others, 
rankings promote homogeneity by incentivizing universities to 
focus their efforts and attention in uniform ways to maintain 
legitimacy and mimic those institutions deemed “high achieving,” 
thereby reinforcing the patterns of “academic drift” (Berdahl  1985 ; 
Morphew and Huisman  2002 ). 
 To demonstrate the isomorphic properties of rankings, we again utilize 
the  USNWR ranking data from 2012, focusing on the 201 unique 
universities receiving a numeric ranking in that year. To these data, 
we merge data on the number of baccalaureate degrees issued by each 
university by Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code, a 
taxonomy developed by the National Center for Education Statistics 
that aggregates individual fields of study into broader categories based 
on subject matter. We use the two-digit CIP codes, which recognize 
54 unique major fields of study that range from the social sciences, to 
engineering, to the liberal arts and sciences. In order to avoid issues of 
scale, we transform each count into a percentage by dividing it by the 
total number of baccalaureate degrees issued. Table  7 lists all of the 54 
CIP codes represented in our data and provides descriptive statistics 
for each of those degree fields based on our 
sample of 201 ranked universities. 
 As one would expect, business, the social 
sciences, and engineering make up large 
proportions of the typical university ’ s 
undergraduate programs. Beyond these 
three categories, however, there is marked 
diversity in the composition of  USNWR -ranked universities’ 
undergraduate programs. 
 In order to test for a relationship between relative rank and 
undergraduate program composition, we first calculate 
pairwise Gower ’ s dissimilarity coefficients for each unique 
pair of universities. Gower ’ s coefficient is a standard measure 
for evaluating the similarity of two observations based on a 
set of specified variables and is widely used in such diverse 
fields as ecology and computer science (Gower  1971 ). This 
measure is bounded by zero, representing two perfectly identical 
observations, and one, representing two perfectly dissimilar 
observations. 
 To determine the relationship between relative rank position and 
our measure of similarity in undergraduate degree programs, 
we calculate the absolute difference in rank between the two 
universities being compared in each unique pair. We then 
simply regress our dissimilarity coefficients on the absolute rank 
differences, thereby determining if similarity in undergraduate 
offerings can be predicted by closeness in  USNWR rank. We also 
include in our regression a vector of variables to control for other 
observed similarities in universities that may have a confounding 
effect on our estimate of the strength of the relationship between 
 Th eories of institutional isomor-
phism are particularly suited 
to explaining the infl uence of 
ranking on universities .
University Rankings: Evidence and a Conceptual Framework 799
undergraduate offerings and ranks. Specifically, we control for 
whether the universities represented in each unique pair operate 
in the same sector (public; private, not-for-profit with religious 
affiliation; private, not-for-profit with no religious affiliation), 
are located in the same census region, have identical land grant 
university status, and are categorized within the same Carnegie 
Classification category (using the 2000 Carnegie Classification 
scheme). We also control for the absolute difference in the natural 
log of total enrollments in order to eliminate the potentially 
confounding effect of similarity in size. Descriptive statistics for 
our dependent and independent variables drawing on our pairwise 
data set are presented in table  8 . The results of estimating our 
regression are reported in table  9 . In order to account for potential 
unmeasured heterogeneity, we apply the Huber-White correction to 
reported standard errors. 
 As these results show, we find a strong, positive, and highly 
statistically significant relationship between the undergraduate 
degree offerings and rank, indicating that, as absolute difference 
in rank increases, the structure of undergraduate programs also 
diverge, all else held constant. This indicates that, controlling for 
all the other variables included in the model, similarly ranked 
universities tend to have similar undergraduate degree offerings. 
Our control variables also demonstrate that other similarities 
between universities beyond rank are associated with the similarity 
of undergraduate offerings as well, in the expected directions: pairs 
of universities with matching institutional characteristics have 
similar undergraduate offerings, and undergraduate offerings diverge 
at universities as discrepancies in size (as measured by the natural 
log of total enrollments) increase. Although not reported here, we 
ran additional models including the absolute difference of revenue 
Table 8  Descriptive Statistics, Full Pairwise Data Set
Mean SD Min. Max.
Gower’s dissimilarity coeffi cient 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.24
Absolute rank difference 66.86 47.00 0.00 193.00
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in 
same sector
0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in same 
Census region
0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Indicator, = 1 if institutions have the 
same land grant designation
0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in the 
same Carnegie Classifi cation group
0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Absolute difference in the natural log 
of total enrollment
0.86 0.68 0.00 4.78
Observations 20,100
 Table 7   Baccalaureate Degree Share by CIP Code for  USNWR -Ranked Universities, 2012 
 Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
Agriculture, agriculture operations, and related sciences 1.20 2.46 0.00 12.60 
Natural resources and conservation 1.15 2.41 0.00 28.34 
Architecture and related services 1.04 2.20 0.00 20.27 
Area, ethnic, cultural, gender, and group studies 0.81 1.26 0.00 7.39 
Communication, journalism, and related programs 5.07 4.28 0.00 19.93 
Communications technologies/technicians and support services 0.05 0.23 0.00 2.10 
Computer and information sciences and support services 2.26 2.53 0.00 16.19 
Personal and culinary services 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.43 
Education 3.98 4.79 0.00 28.12 
Engineering 10.10 13.10 0.00 87.93 
Engineering technologies and engineering-related fi elds 0.83 1.97 0.00 14.70 
Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics 1.60 1.23 0.00 6.68 
Family and consumer sciences/human sciences 1.51 2.50 0.00 10.96 
Legal professions and studies 0.15 0.56 0.00 5.68 
English language and literature/letters 3.18 1.86 0.00 12.87 
Liberal arts and sciences, general studies, and humanities 1.63 2.75 0.00 13.95 
Library science 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Biological and biomedical sciences 7.26 4.32 0.00 36.78 
Mathematics and statistics 1.54 1.39 0.00 9.91 
Military technologies and applied sciences 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Multi/interdisciplinary studies 2.00 2.50 0.00 14.40 
Parks, recreation, leisure, and fi tness studies 1.71 2.13 0.00 8.70 
Philosophy and religious studies 0.86 1.07 0.00 11.11 
Theology and religious vocations 0.14 1.05 0.00 14.27 
Physical sciences 2.16 2.08 0.00 22.84 
Science technologies/technicians 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.82 
Psychology 6.21 3.15 0.00 20.04 
Homeland security, law enforcement, fi refi ghting, and related protective service 1.13 2.01 0.00 11.66 
Public administration and social service professions 1.02 1.46 0.00 7.62 
Social sciences 11.17 7.87 0.00 41.88 
Construction trades 0.04 0.44 0.00 6.27 
Mechanic and repair technologies/technicians 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.70 
Precision production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Transportation and materials moving 0.19 1.07 0.00 11.88 
Visual and performing arts 4.67 5.35 0.00 68.27 
Health professions and related programs 6.91 7.64 0.00 54.70 
Business, management, marketing, and related support services 16.21 9.68 0.00 72.22 
History 2.22 1.44 0.00 8.62 
Observations 201
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 Table 9   Regression Results Dependent variable: Gower ’ s dissimilarity coefficient 
of university baccalaureate degree shares 
Absolute rank difference 0.0002 *** (0.0000) 
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in same sector (public or 
private, not for profi t)
−0.0032 *** (0.0004) 
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in same census region −0.0022 *** (0.0006) 
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are both land grant colleges/
universities
−0.0043 *** (0.0004) 
Indicator, = 1 if institutions are in the same Carnegie 
classifi cation
−0.0041 *** (0.0004) 
Absolute difference in the natural log of total enrollment 0.0085 *** (0.0003) 
Constant 0.0892 *** (0.0007) 
Observations 20,100
 Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. 
 * p < .10;  ** p < .05;  *** p < .01. 
per FTE enrolled student as well as the absolute difference in 
educational expenditures per FTE enrolled student in order to test 
for the potential additional confounding influence of differences in 
wealth and expenditure patterns. Those results yielded substantively 
similar findings to those reported in table  9 . 
 Admittedly, this is only suggestive evidence of the isomorphic 
pressure exerted by rankings. Isomorphism is a dynamic process by 
definition, and our reliance on static, cross-sectional data means 
that, while we can observe a result consistent with the proposition, 
we are unable to directly observe the process driving the patterns 
of outcomes that we identify. However, despite the fact that 
 USNWR rankings make no distinctions 
in the rating criteria according to field or 
diversity of undergraduate degree offerings, 
our empirical finding is consistent with a 
general isomorphic pressure to conform 
that is reinforced by the  USNWR ranking 
regime. This is a finding that warrants further 
investigation and could be straightforwardly 
extended utilizing panel data. 
 If ranking drives processes of change in the direction of institutional 
homogeneity, are the forces of ranking-driven change making 
universities less effective, as the theory of institutional isomorphism 
would predict? A recent comprehensive study of American schools 
of law suggests that this is the case (Jones  2013 ). It is suggested 
elsewhere that if equilibrium is the default condition under 
university and college ranking regimes, universities and colleges 
will not risk change except changes in the direction of ranking 
criteria. Rankings are, therefore, “an enemy of college and university 
creativity and innovation and a form of institutional isomorphism” 
(Frederickson and Stazyk  2010 , 76). Universities tend to resist 
change, and contextual factors in addition to ranking, such as 
systems of accreditation, systems of evaluation and performance 
measurement, and systems of accountability, magnify those 
tendencies. Although it is difficult to isolate the influence of ranking 
from the power of context, this should not be taken to deny the 
homogenizing influence of rankings. 
 Conclusions 
 As we enter the second generation of university ranking, it is 
appropriate to take stock of what we have learned. Ranking 
systems exhibit a high degree of macro-level predictability, as 
that ranking organizations churn their annual rankings as they 
attempt to hold interest or to make news. We demonstrate 
here that, once a ranking organization sets its ranking criteria, 
the order of the ranks of universities is quite stable and seldom 
exhibit long-term change. Despite the equilibrium associated with 
university rankings, our analysis provides evidence consistent with 
the proposition that ranking influences university planning and 
policy, much of that influence in the direction of criteria set by 
ranking organizations. 
 Certainly, the correlations we identify fall short of casual proof 
of these propositions in practice. Nonetheless, we argue that 
the quantitative, empirical associations we uncover in the data 
do provide strong suggestive evidence of the influence of ranking 
systems on the universities they seek to evaluate that can inform 
the next generation of rankings research. Future studies should 
take the next logical step of building on the foundation we 
establish to differentiate the impact of the multiple alternative 
and confounding forces that influence university behavior, 
thereby gauging the relative strengths of these forces. Institutions 
of higher education vary widely in context and in purpose. 
Ranking systems must take these differences seriously, as must 
those doing research on the ranking of institutions of higher 
education. 
 There are some important implications of our findings with respect 
to the continued viability of systems of higher education in the 
United States and elsewhere that are worthy 
of discussion. The confluence of evidence 
suggests that imposition of ranking regimes 
is not a catalyst of innovation in higher 
education unless that innovation favors 
ranking criteria. Rankings simplify, reducing 
university qualities, contexts, and unique 
characteristics to simpler metrics. Rankings 
decontextualize. Rankings magnify small 
differences. Rankings mask complexity and 
hide ambiguity. Rankings replace “different than” with “better 
than.” But, even knowing this, university ranking regimes continue 
to be influential. Why? 
 In the American context, the criteria used by  USNWR certainly 
represent the dominant identifying characteristics of the traditional 
American research university. To be sure, there are variations on 
that model, including the American regional universities, the urban 
universities, the liberal arts colleges, the community colleges. These 
are institutions that, taken together, educate far more people than 
those educated at the institutions categorized in the Carnegie 
Classifications as “Doctoral/Research University—Extensive.” 
Nevertheless, research universities continue to define the model 
privileged by ranking organizations, and thereby rankings continue 
to advantage historically elite institutions. 
 Second-generation university ranking is increasingly marked by 
competing ranking organizations using different criteria. In the 
United States, this is most notable in the ranking of business schools 
and MBA programs, with three competing ranking organizations. It 
is also a characteristic of international or global university ranking 
regimes, also with three primary ranking organizations. Some 
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ranking organizations, most notably  Bloomberg Businessweek, use 
survey-based methodology and “soft” criteria, such as “student 
experience,” in their rankings of business schools. As with the 
ranking systems discussed earlier, these approaches demonstrate 
aggregate stability with micro-level fluctuation that seems 
attributable to randomness as much as systematic improvement or 
decline despite the differing methodology employed. For example, 
the top 15 business schools are always the top 15, but Harvard 
moves from first to eighth and Duke moved from sixth to first in 
the 2014  Businessweek rankings. Despite the rather obvious question 
of how or whether the Harvard MBA program got significantly 
worse and the Duke MBA got significantly better, all in the 
space of 12 months, this churning, or noise, seems to capture the 
attention of the media, much like the attention given the ranking 
of university football teams. More to the point, the MBA ranking 
program at  Bloomberg Businessweek is vigorously competing with 
 USNWR, the dominant player in the ranking game, and with 
 Forbes, the other important MBA ranking game participant. 
 Some interesting and important recent developments have also 
emerged that have the potential to introduce significant changes to 
the rankings landscape. One is the renewed focus on value-added 
approaches to evaluating institutions of higher education (Cunha 
and Miller  2014 ). Value-added measures offer the potential to 
overcome some of the well-known shortcomings of the traditional 
ranking systems. First, they largely focus on intermediate or 
long-term outcomes rather than inputs (such as faculty salaries, 
volumes of books and periodicals housed, or average ACT score of 
matriculating freshmen) or outputs (such as grants awarded, articles 
published, or students retained). Value-added measures instead focus 
on measures such as degree completion or the economic success 
of graduates, measured through placements or salaries. Second, 
value-added measurement attempts to partition these outcomes into 
two distinct components by explicitly controlling for the relative 
differences in inputs across universities (in terms of both students as 
well as other resources), thereby making a more plausible attempt 
to estimate the direct, marginal contribution of the university to the 
well-being of the students it serves. Rankings of universities built 
around value-added measures contribute a very different perspective 
than that represented by traditional ranking regimes, largely 
concluding that the highest-achieving institutions are those focusing 
on engineering, STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
math), and medical fields (Rothwell  2015 ). Proponents of value-
added measures argue that they put all universities on equal footing 
for comparison and that value-added measures of higher education 
institutions exhibit a high degree of consistency over time. Critics 
argue that value-added measures simply substitute new biases for old 
ones, pointing out that differences across universities in tabulating 
student outcome data combined with relying on noisy outcome 
measures such as graduate salaries make value-added measures less 
reliable and useful than they appear. 
 A related second development in the domain of rankings is the 
recent attempt by the U.S. federal government to develop an 
alternative source of institutional rankings. In 2013, President 
Barack Obama announced that the federal government would 
develop a new consumer-driven ratings system explicitly designed 
to compete with  USNWR, but with a primary focus on college 
affordability and value (Obama  2013 ). However, the rankings that 
the president proposed never materialized, partly because of a lack 
of support from key institutional stakeholders who questioned 
both the overall usefulness of the exercise in an already crowded 
space as well as the validity and reliability of the indicators that 
the administration proposed. Instead, the administration released 
an updated College Scorecard that “provides key measures of 
institutional performance in a clear, concise format designed to be 
easy to access on mobile devices” but stopped short of providing any 
actual rankings (NACUBO 2016). 
 As higher education in the United States and abroad enters the 
second generation of experience with ranking and universities 
continue to make sense of it, we should ask larger questions: Have 
rankings been a force for improvement in higher education? If so, 
for whom and in what ways? Does higher education ranking merely 
confuse status and prestige with quality, thereby reifying already elite 
universities? (Pusser and Marginson  2012 ). As ranking organizations 
continue their work, it is imperative that their influence continue to 
be the subject of rigorous empirical research. 
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